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and transport mobilised in conjunction with airlines and
shipping companies. Such an operation would have to be hastily
improvised but in the circumstances in which it would be mounted
there would be few (if any) inhibitions about making overtly
the most effective arrangements we could.
5.
Consideration has also been given to what might be said
publicly about plans for the evacuation of Hong Kong, should this question be raised openly (as it has been, for example,
in the House of Lords). The dilemma is that if it is said
there are no plans this could lead to a public outcry in the
United Kingdom; while to avoid a direct answer in a manner
that implies there might be such plans (e.g. by saying that
these are matters that are not disclosed) could seriously
impair confidence in Hong Kong. It has been agreed that we
should continue to try to avoid a direct answer, standing
generally on publie statements that H.M.G. intends to fulfil
its responsibilities and obligations to the-Golony but that,
if necessary, it should be flatly stated that H.M.G. is not
planning to evacuate Hong Kong, pointing to the fact that there
are some 2 million citizens of the U.K. and Colonies in Hong
Kong to whom H.M.G's. responsibilities extend.
6.
dended
A copy of this Aide Memoire has been sent to the Governor of Hong Kong and (through the Governor) to the Commander
British Forces. Copies have been supplied in the United Kingdom
to the Cabinet Office, Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence.
Hong Kong Department, Commonwealth Office.
January, 1968.