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of the Colony owing to the intensification of civil disturbances or where

Chinese troops had crossed the frontior in force. It was considered,

howover, that in practice, the difference between the two situations would

have no great significanco. If control of the situation in the Colony wore

lost, then Chinoso military intervention would be likely; if, on the other

hand, the Chineso planned to launch a military attack, they would arrango

for it to be accompanied by widespread disturbances in Hong Kong. In either

cass, police and British forces would be fully oxtended and able to do

little to cover an evacuation.

(c) It is clear from the foregoing that the possibility of being able to

ovacuato our trops would be remote, except in the unlikely circumstances

of a negotiated, large-scale withdrawal from the Colony. A fighting

withdrawal on the lines of Dunkirk, when all else had been over-run, could

not be entirely excluded if shipping could be made available, but it seems

most improbable. Should it not provo possible to extricate our troops,

they would of course add significantly to the number of hostages who could

be used by the Chinese for bargaining purposes.

(d) As indicated above, knowledge that ovacuation planning was in progress

would deal a severe blow to public confidence in the Colony. Tho

strictost precautions to avoid any leak are thoroforo nocossary.

(o) The paper does not take into account the possible effects on opinion

in the Colony, and honce on our possible plans for evacuation, of action

by other nations, in particular the United States, if the situation in the

Colony worsened. Such action for oxample, the evacuation of dependants

might inspire lack of confidence in our om intentions; in such a case we

might have to undertake moro overt planning ourselves in concert with other

Governments concerned. This howover would accentuate any crisis of

confidence and would be liable to rosult in our losing control of the

situation. It is not possible to speculate usefully on the likelihood

of the United States taking promaturo action to ovacuato dopondants, or

planning to do so soo also paragraph 8 bolow.

During the disturbancos

in Macao they hold on till the last moment, but in Nigoria and Libya thoy

seemed unduly alarmist.

If the Americans did ovacuate their ow

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