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and New Zealand units in it without the artillery, engineer and logistic support they at present receive, and the brigade would probably cease to exist. For Australia and New Zealand to maintain their present force declarations to SEATO, and to keep land forces in Malaysia, they would need to make alternative arrangements.
(b) In Case A we should have no regular military presence in
Malaysia, except insofar as Gurkha units in excess of
the force level might be stationed there. (We should however need to retain training facilities in Malaysia).
Implications for our Commitments
7. The force levels in the Far East considered in Study No. 7 would not enable us to carry out all our existing commitments. The principal implications are as follows
DAVET DET BARE
(a) SEATO. We should not be able to maintain our present force declarations to SEATO Plan 4 (defence of the SEATO area against attack by China and North Vietnam). The other of the SEATO plans that may be considered realistic in present circumstances is Plan 8 (Counter-insurgency in Thailand). In Case B we should be able to meet our present declaration to Plan 8 in full, and in Case A we could provide its equivalent in combat units; but in this latter Case Australian and New Zealand contributions both to Plaen 4 and Plan 8 would be affected.
(b) Defence of Malaysia. Apart from the small forces provided to
secure the point of entry and our defence facilities, and for our other national commitments, the land forces that we could contribute to the defence of Malaysia against external attack would be limited to those in the Commonwealth Strategic Force which would also be declared to SEATO and to a reinforcing brigade from the United Kingdom. (There would also be substantial air and naval reinforcements). relation to what would be needed to defend Malaysia successfully against a determined attack. In particular, it is unlikely that East Malaysia could be defended effectively.
J
This bears little
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