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Course of Action to be Pursued
40. The oversea political Departments take the view that taken overall we shall make the largest net savings in the context of a politically acceptable policy by reductions in Singapore and Malaysia which begin gradually and speed up in later years. Our eventual objective would be to give up our bases in Singapore and Malaysia; to maintain there- after a minimum presence, with mainly maritime and air forces, using facilities in Australia, and to retain total withdrawal as a possible option for the longer term. Provided we prepare the way for this programme we would expect to achieve it in a manner consistent with our main political interests, once there has been a settlement of the Vietnam war. But for political reasons (mainly connected with Vietnam but also related to local reactions in Singapore and Malaysia) this process of preparation should involve a quiet rundown rather than a dramatic announcement of major reductions. For purely practical reasons major reductions could not in any event be carried out before 1968 and in circumstances of political difficulty they would involve
hoavy offsetting expenditures. Te need to create the nost favourable political circumstances for reducing the offsetting expenditures or at least for stretching them out. Accordingly, the most effective course seems to be to continue to run down cur forces in
the Far East with reductions of about one-half on the lines of Study No. 7 as our immediate goal but not to announce our intention of leaving Singapore and Malaysia until such time as political circumstances allow us to do so. It is the announcement of our intention to leave by a specified date rather than the fact that one day we may do so which will be the immediate cause of serious political trouble. Such a course would avoid the more extreme forms of political and economic pressure. It would avoid results in Singapore which could be disastrous. While pursuing this Policy we should be in continuous consultation with our allies with the object of bringing them to accept our long-term strategy (i.e. a peripheral deployment of Western forces "over the horizon' from the Asian mainland) and to institute the practical arrangements which will be necessary both for the economy of Singapore and for our facilities in Australia.
41. The Department of Economic Affairs and the Treasury, however, point cut the great dangers in limiting action at this stage to reductions of about one-half in our Far East force levels by 1970-71, in the hope that we shall get acquiesence to complete withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore over the following three to five years. At best this would probably turn out to be five years (i.e. 1976) rather than three. At worst the process of securing acquiesence to a reduction of one-half
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