(97793)
TOP SECRET
37. It is urgent, therefore, that a decision should be taken on the broad scale of the reductions we should make, and on their timing. Other matters can then be considered, including the general line to be pursued in consulta- tion with our friends and allies and, within this, the extent to which, if we are to stay in the Far East for some years ahead, we should take account of their views on the alternatives in Study No. 7 of doing so by means of a maritime or a land/air presence before reaching a decision on the merits of these alternatives or of some variant of them.
Timing
38. We cannot plan any reductions in detail, nor even assess precisely the outcome in terms of finance and employment, without local consultations. We cannot therefore estimate the net financial effect of possible reductions, given the difficulty of estimating the amount of economic and military aid we may need to give and the offsetting costs on the United Kingdon. We cannot however start the necessary consultations without a decision from Ministers on whether we are to retain a military presence in Singapore and Malaysia in 1970 and for how long thereafter. It is essential to break out of this vicious circle if we are to achieve the desired savings. Unless negotiations and
consultations start soon, there is no prospect of our being able to make even an interim announcement in the early summer at the same time as we shall be announcing a decision on our force levels in Germany. The sooner we start consultations, the sooner we can start to achieve savings and, other things being equal, the longer we shall have to mitigate their political effect and local economic damage by phasing them more slowly.
39. United Kingdom Ministers will be attending the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting on 6th and 7th April and the SEATO Ministerial meeting on 18th-20th April. They will undoubtedly be pressed on these occasions to make
clear to our allies our intentions on force withdrawals. A decision is
required on how far we should indicate at these meetings, and any preliminary discussions, what reductions we are intending to make; any case we should say that we shall be ready soon to begin detailed
discussion.
but in
-16-
TOP SECRET