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certainly continue until 1971; the Prime Minister of Singapore has also said (in October 1966) "ten years hence I cannot guarantee what stand in British will adopt or the economic environment they will encounter. If the Labour Party of Britian is able to improve the economic position and Britain and succeeds in repairing the economic position then no problem will arise in the next ten or even twenty years." The earliest date at which we could complete an orderly evacuation of the base, even in purely military terms, would be some time in the early 1970s. It would appear therefore that there might not be a very large difference in time between the date when total withdrawal is practicable for us and the date when Malaysia and Singapore, if not Australia and New Zealand might be brought to accept our complete withdrawal, and by that time the present obstacle of Vietnam may no longer lie in the path of our relations with the Americans on this issue, just as the removal of the obstacle of Confrontation has enabled us to reduce our forces to the Defence Review
levels earlier than we had originally planned.
Consultations
36. It has been repeatedly stated as our policy that any reductions we
We might make in the Far East should be first discussed with our allies. have a treaty obligation to consult Malaysia and this must also be taken as extending to Singapore. In addition we have a moral obligation to consult, and other reasons for consulting, the United States and Australia and New Zealand, as well as commitments to SEATO (see Annex C). Our Defence Review force levels were fully discussed at meetings in Washington
and Canberra before any announcement was made. Therefore before we can announce our future intentions we must begin these consultations, which we cannot expect to go smoothly. If we are to make an announcement before June or July to match the timing of an announcement on force withdrawals from Germany, we must clearly begin the consultations at the earliest possible opportunity. It will not be possible to begin these discussions without having to say whether or not we intend to maintain a military
presence in the Indo-Pacific area, at least for some years, and whether, if we do, it is to be maintained in Singapore and Malaysia or elsewhere. We shall also have to declare our position on economic aid in mitigation.
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