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33. Furthermore, if we assume that we would wish to withdraw in an orderly manner and not be responsible for political chaos in Singapore resulting from too rapid rundown, since chaos there would have repercussions on the stability of the whole area, then the practical limitations on the speed of our withdrawal are much more severe. Unless we carry the Singapore authorities with us they could severely embarrass our withdrawal. On the basis of Study No. 7 some 16-18,000 local employees of the Services
would be declared redundant in Singapore alone. Without taking into
account those privately employed, this would mean that more than a half
of those now directly employed by the Services would be without jobs. Quite apart from this rundown, present trends in unemployment would result
in 17 per cent of the rapidly rising labour force being jobless by 1970.
There is bound to be great pressure therefore to spread these redundancies
over the longest possible period. A fortiori, pressure to spread the much greater redundancies resulting from complete withdrawal would be even
more intense. The economic effects on Singapore are being examined, with
the implications for our economic aid. These are very great and need
to be fully assessed and our policy on remedial aid considered before we
get into substantive consultations with Singapore.
34. Another practical limitation to the speed at which a minimum
presence could be established in Australia is that some facilities would
need to be developed, though primarily of an order which the Australians
are likely in any event to require. Discussions with the Australians on
the precise nature of the facilities, and their construction, together with
the subsequent deployment of our forces, would take some years.
Summary on Complete Withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia
35. If weight is given both to these longer term considerations, and above all to the practical limitations set out in paragraphs 32-34,
in the next two or three years the dinstinction between the initial
stages of a gradual reduction of our forces and those of complete withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore may prove in practice not to be substantial. The Singapore Government have taken as their own assumption
that a British military presence at pre-Confrontation strength would
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