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28. Total withdrawal by 1970-71 would have the following political disadvantages. We would put at risk our long term aim that the countries of the area should build their own independent groupings with a capacity to resist China, since we cannot expect this to be achieved in three years. With our guidance and support Malaysia and Singapore have developed considerable democratic and economic strength; but their stability would be threatened by the premature withdrawal of our forces. Even massive economic aid to Singapore could not in this time-scale prevent additional widespread unemployment. The outcome would be social and political disorder which either by itself or through leading to a communist-oriented government might in turn provoke intervention from Malaysia and/or Indonesia. Circumstances could arise in which it would be impossible to secure an orderly withdrawal of our forces and equipment; e.g. if Malaysia and Singapore were to react by withdrawing our rights on the analogy of Malta.
29. The United States, Australia and New Zealand would forcefully
maintain that we had acted irresponsibly in removing our stabilising
influence prematurely. It would be difficult to rebut these charges. Moreover, apart from our treaty commitments, we should be acting in direct contradiction to the assurances Ministers gave only last year
that we intended to remain in the area. This would have wider repercussions on our international standing. So long as they are engaged in Vietnam the United States would be especially critical of our action; and this
might have effects in other fields where we are heavily dependent on
their support.
Minimum Presence in Australia
30. We cannot produce even a broad estimate of the cost of a possible
limited military presence in Australia, but we would expect it to be
substantially less than the cost even of a reduced presence in Singapore
on the Study No. 7 basis.
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