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22.
Our force levels under Study 7 would not allow us to carry out all
our present commitments. They would however, be sufficient to meet our broad political objectives, provided we could receive the acceptance of
our allies to them Although we have no specific commitment to
Singapore on the force levels we should maintain there we should also
need to secure broad agreement with Singapore on the rundown if our
political objectives are to be met.
23. Within the context of existing external policies (i.e. retaining a presence in Singapore) we will therefore have the possibility of
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(a) Some lesser reduction than is provided for under Study No. 7, if this
should prove necessary to secure the agreement of our allies; (b) the reductions provided for in Study No. 7, on either of
the two options;
(c) some greater reductions than Study No. 7.
Reductions under (c) might include study of the following points
the need for forces to guard our defence facilities; the need to maintain permanently in the Far East a conventional and nuclear strike capability (the same forces would provide both); and the nature of our future
commitment to Malaysia on which so much of our requirement for reinforcement from the United Kingdom depends. As for our dependent territories our recent agreement with Hong Kong precludes the possibility of a further defence contribution in the time-scale relevant to these studies, i.e., up to 1970-71. The dangers of a major racial disturbance in Fiji require
us to maintain an ability to intervene with British troops during the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, we should continue to seek ways in which we may be released from our specific commitments if maintaining
these is not essential to our broad policies and interests in the area. The only one of these possibilities, however, that has any chance of producing substantial savings is a change in the nature of our future commitment to Malaysia; we have not however studied what may be possible along these lines, and in any event it would undoubtedly
be very difficult to negotiate in present circumstances.
-Im
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