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Mediterranean and Middle East
15. The second group of studies relates to the Mediterranean and Middle East. As far as the Mediterranean is concerned, the Defence Review decisions on Malta will be implemented, but the savings will be considerably delayed. Apart from Libya, Malta, and Gibraltar which is a special case, our deploy- ment in the Mediterranean is largely attributable to our commitments to CENTO. Our interest in maintaining CENTO and continuing to play an active part in it is largely related to the position of Iran, and it is not yet possible to say whether the reappraisal of the value of CENTO in the longer term (Study No. 3) is likely to result in our being able to make savings as early as 1970-71. In any case it is unlikely that they could be large in
that time-scale,
16.
Elsewhere in the Middle East, our withdrawal from Aden is of course in
train.
In the Persian Gulf in the long run we do not want to protect our economic interests by means of a military presence, but equally we cannot afford to withdraw so hurriedly that the stability of the area is undermined. Complete withdrawal in the time-scale we have been set is therefore undesirable. Our defence costs in the Middle East are in any case small in relation to those in our two main overseas theatres, Germany and the Far East.
17. Moreover we have, in presenting our withdrawal from Aden to our allies, including the Shah of Iran, made it clear that we intend to maintain, and indeed slightly reinforce, our military position in the Persian Gulf for the time being; and in this context Ministers have accepted
(OPD (67) 1st Meeting, Item 1) the conclusions of Study No. 4 that the stationing of a second battalion at Sharjah is unavoidable.
At the same
time we have told the Amir of Kuwait that our commitment to him would not extend beyond the provision of air support unless we received a considerable period of advance warning, and this has enabled us to reduce military
stockpiles.
-Ex
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