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that time the situation in the Far East may well have changed e.g. the conflict in Vietnam may have ended and it would then be easier to obtain acceptance of our complete withdrawal from Singapore. When the situation is so fluid there are strong political arguments for not committing our- selves further ahead than 1970-71, while saying that we intend to reduce our forces drastically and that while in the longer run it is generally under- stood that we may not remain in Singapore, we do not propose yet to fix a date for total withdrawal. The political Departments also point out that we are here seeking not only to plan for a tine in the future when political circumstances may have changed but we have also to recognise that we are not wholly free agents, since we must take into account the views of other countries affected. Recent experience in Malta, Aden and elsewhere has underlined the disadvantages of planning internationally to fixed dates.
12. Ministers may wish to read the fuller statement of the differing
departmental cases in paragraphs 40-42 of the report.
13. Consultations with our allies are required to establish the degree of
political acceptability of the course which Ministers wish to follow. In Singapore and Malaysia investigations on the ground, followed by early negotiations, cre also needed to establish what the full practical and financial implications of the chosen course are, both for the rate of reduction
of forces and for our aid. In these negotiations it will be necessary to
declare our attitude towards aid in mitigation.
It is therefore necessary
to have a very early indication from Ministers of the broad lines on which
they would wish these consultations to be initiated and of the course further
defence studies should take.
14.
In the light of this Ministers are asked to give guidance on whether: (a) we should plan on a reduction of about half in our forces in Singapore
and Malaysia by 1970-71, with the necessary modification cf our commitments,
while not committing ourselves even for internal planning purposes to a
date for eventual withdrawal, but leaving this to be determined as the
situation develops in the Far East; or
(b) we should plan on the earliest practicable withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore, while establishing a minimum presence in Australia.
If so
(i) whether the date 1975-76 should be accepted for course (b) or
whether there should be stuly to see if an earlier date is practicable, and
(ii) whether this date should be published not later than the middle
of this year.
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
20th March 1967
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