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5. The report concentrates on our policy in the Far East because room for manoeuvre in other theatres in the next few years is very limited and The size of the forces that we are the further savings obtainable small.
If a total
to provide for the Far best after 1970-71 will however be critical to the defence budget not only directly but also indirectly in their effect on the
it is in fact size and nature of the United Kingdom base and facilities; the one remaining major variable in our forward defence planning. withdrawal from the whole of the Far East including Australia is disregarded as a practical possibility (which is the view of the Committee) there are broadly two courses. The first is to go no further for the moment than to plan (and iitiate consultations) on a najor reduction of our forces to about half their present level by 1970-71 (with a consequential modification of our commitments see paragraph 21 of the attached report), while leaving the decision on the date of eventual withdrawal to be taken as the situation develops. The second is to fix a date, at least for planning purposes, for leaving Singapore and Malaysia and for establishing a minimum presence in Australia (largely for political reasons).
G
6. The savings resulting from these courses cannot be quantified at this stage, for the reasons given in the report. Nor can the additional economic aid that would be needed: this depends on the rate of reduction and on the outcone of negotiations with Singapore and Malaysia. But clearly total withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore, accompanied by a minimum presence in Australia, would yield higher net total budgetary savings than a reduction of our forces by about half.
7.
In considering the course which should be followed there are con-
flicting considerations which turn largely on tining and presentation.
8. On the one hand, if the defence programe is to be planned with the maximum economy, a firm planning assumption is needed about the date of our withdrawal from the Far East, so that the forces and their equipment can broadly be shaped accordingly from now on. The main areas of the defence
programme involved are
(a)
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The manpower situation. Any plan which would, as is the present case,
have a radical effect on the size of the Services at home and abroad, must
work itself out over a period of at least five years from the time cf decision
if it is to avoid indefensible treatment of the individual, an unbalanced age/rank structure, and lasting dange to recruiting.
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