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64. The above figures are, at this stage, possible orders of magnitude only; but the estimated annual outlay on all forms of mitigating assistance is the best guess we can make at present of the amount we shall find it necessary to
give, and it will of course taper away over a period. It must, finally, be emphasised that these figures are broad estimates only and the achievement of the savings depends on determination to see them through in the face of the many difficulties that will inevitably arise.
F. SUMMARY
65. We aim to reduce our forces in Singapore and Malaysia by about half by 1970-71 and to leave altogether by 1975-76. The speed and manner in which the reductions can be implemented will require the successful conclusion of the consultations with our allies, and depend on the impact of our reductions on local economies and the reorganisation of our own forces. Further examination is required before it is possible to specify in detail the force levels resulting from the new policy in the Far East in 1970-71 or 1975-76; but it will be possible to have available a broad indication of future force levels by the time a public statement of policy is made.
66. However, the initial proposal would be that by 1970-71 our main presence in Singapore and Malaysia would be with maritime and air forces, land-based forces having been withdrawn except for some Gurkhas. Conventional and
nuclear strike forces would not be stationed in the theatre. The forces we
might maintain in Australia after complete withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia would be limited to very small naval forces and a very small number
of aircraft.
67. In consequence force declarations to SEATO plans will have to be progressively reduced, starting this year. Our contribution to the Commonwealth Brigade will be withdrawn by 1969. Any land forces required for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore will have to be found from reinforcements; by 1970-71 there will be insufficient stockpiles of equipment for such reinforcements and they could not be effective in operations for three months. Naval and air forces will be insufficient for a major operation without reinforcement from west of Suez. Before 1970-71 we shall have to secure an understanding with Malaysia and Singapore that our treaty obligation would be limited to the presence of maritime and air forces, and that land forces could not be guaranteed for major operations in under three months. By 1975-76 any force contribution to
SEATO will have to be on an "if available" basis and our treaty
obligations will have to have been further modified.
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