offer of a small military presente but also by saying in response to
TOP SECRET
any request for one no more than that we would consider the point later.
In the context of these discussions, it would clearly be difficult to
do this. Should we finally decide on a small maritime and air
presence it will be necessary at some stage to reach an understanding with Australia and New Zealand about the purposes which such forces
are to serve. With Singapore, and to a lesser extent Malaysia, we should emphasise our concern to do all that we could to ensure economic
stability by providing aid on a generous scale to offset the effects of our military rundown, drawing attention also to the possibility of assistance from development agencies and to the use which they might make in developing their economy of the various facilities that we would be giving up. It would be important from the outset for us to do all that we can to ensure that any offer of aid that we make, oven in a generalised form, is as tightly linked as possible to a programme agreed with us covering military as well as economic plans, including our own rate of rundown. While conscious of the bargaining position of other governments we must equally be mindful of our own, including in particular the provision of a crucially important level
of aid as an integral part of the operation.
6. A main point for decision is when we should inform our allies of the date by which we plan to withdraw all our forces from Malaysia and Singapore, in more precise terms than telling them that we shall have withdrawn by about the mid-1970s. Until we have committed ourselves domestically to a date we are inhibited in planning the detailed rundown of our forces and thus in carrying out an economical military programme, and in discussing, particularly with Singapore, the means of mitigating the economic consequences of our withdrawal since remedial measures are essentially a matter of long-term planning. Once we have adopted a planning date for our own purposes it will be impossible to prevent it leaking sooner or later; but to disclose a precise date of 1975-76 as distinct from the mid-1970s in the initial round would give an
unnecessary appearance of rigid preconceptions and would thus make our task of obtaining acquiescence much more difficult. The timing of this disclosure should in our view be further considered in the light of the initial round of discussions.
7.
In the consultations with Australia and New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, we should make it clear that we were ready for discussions between officials on the consequences of our plans before final decisions are taken in the middle of the year; the difficulty in these discussions will be to avoid their developing into negotiations implying commitments before we are ready to take final decisions, We shall also at that
stage, or shortly thereafter, have to inform Thailand, the Philippines and Japan of our proposals in broad terms.
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
•TOP SECRÉT
11th April 1967
(97793)