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CINCFE.1511/6130/18
(Amendment List No 1)
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Reference:
The Sherelin (CRO)
UK EYES. ONLY
no. 5 Copy No 6 of 60
Headquarters
Far East Command Phoenix Park c/o GPO Singapore
28th April 1967
SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE HE'D AT
HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND
ON MONDAY 24th APRIL 1967
CINCFE.1511/6130/18 dated 27th April 1967.
The paper at reference should be amended as follows:
1.
&•
Delete: from "Short-term reductions" (Line 14, page 6) to "personnel" (line 30, page 7), inclusive.
Insert: revised text as follows:
Short-term reductions to 1st April 1968, would require a reduction in the tasks of FARELF before they could be achieved, Even assuming that it would be possible to re-negotiate our commitments to SEATO in the very near future, it was unlikely that any significant reductions
To obtain any could be achieved during the current financial year. significant reduction it would be necessary to reduce teeth arms and this could not be done without a reduction in the Army's tasks in the Far East. The Gurkha rundown plan stretched to early 70 and should not be speeded up. The base facilities were geared to tasks and the size of the teeth arms and they could not be reduced arbitrarily without reducing our capability to meet our commitments. By economies in existing establishments and some further rationalisation, some 200 odd might be cut by the spring of 1968 but this would result in civilian redundancy. The ratio of military personnel to civilians
in the base was:-
41/2
550 Officers) 2,654 Soldiers)
3,204
LEP
2,871 Civilians 14,600
Dealing with the long-term reduction to 50% by 1970/71, it would be necessary to depend, to a large extent, on reinforcements from UK to meet our commitments, unless these were considerably reduced. main fields to which we could look for eductions were:-
The
(1)
Force contributions to SEATO Plans 4 and 8
(2)
Force available for operations in support of dependent territories and other contingencies.
(3)
Logistic support.
(4) Gurkhas.
Cuts in teeth arms located in Singapore and Malaysia would call for replacements when operations are ordered, and cuts in logistic units would need revision of plans for logistic support. We might have to look to our allies to assist in this direction, This could increase the time factor. Teeth-arm build-up (ex UK) would take longer. A longer warning period would thus be needed and we would have to negotiate alternative logistic support plans with our allies, example of the size of the logistic tasks the following details of stocks held in the Singapore base were given:--
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