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RECORD OF A TALK AND THE HON. LE
BET EEN THE RT. HON. DENIS HEALEY, MBE
KUAN YEW, PRIME MINISTER OF SING FORE
23RD APRIL, 1967
On Sunday 23rd April, the Rt. Hon. Denis Healey, Secretary of State for Defence met Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore on the latter's yacht and, during the course of a cruise lasting one and a half hours, Mr. Healey outlined HMG's new policy thinking about the deployment of British forces in the Far East. Mr. George Bogaars, the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Interior and Defence, and Mr. P.D. Nairne, Private Secretary to the Defence Secretary, were also present.
New Defence Policy Approach
2. MR. HEALEY referred to the foreign exchange crisis of 1966; defence expenditure overseas had had to take its share of the cuts which had been planned, but decisions then had not called in question the major features of policy which had emerged from the Defence Review. Since last summer, however, it had become clear that economic factors required more radical changes in policy, particularly in relation to the Far East, where the foreign exchange burden was heavy. The immediate aim of IHG would be to achieve by 1970/71 a cut in Singapore and Malaysia of around a half in force levels and in locally engaged personnel; this would mean for Singapore a reduction in the latter of about 15,000 by 1970/71, though the balance of cuts between Singapore and Malaysia had not yet been worked out in detail, and it was not clear whether cuts could be achieved at the pace envisaged. In addition, Her Majesty's Government were now considering reductions in their forces as a whole; and they were also looking beyond 1970/71 in rolation to the Far East, while recognising that this would involve changes in, or the re-negotiation of, some current commitments. It had boon decided to assume, for planning purposes, that British forces would be off the mainland of Asia by the mid 1970s, though no date of final withdrawal had been finally fixed. As to the period beyond the mid 1970s, no decision had been taken on any residual military capability for use in the Far East; nor was there any firm idea about the nature and deployment of any such capability, if it were decided to retain one.
3. MR. HEALEY said that he recognised that what he had to say was unpalatable. HMG were now at the stage at which they wished to have the views of Singapore and Malaysia; and the object of his visit was to explore the practical implications of a programme on the lines he had outlined in relation to the economy and security of Singapore, as well as to British forces in the area. IG recognised that Singapore would be likely to need cid on a significant soclo; and he hoped that, as a first step, Lee Kuan Yew would agree that a fact-finding team, including economists, should arrive in Singapore on April 26th. MR. HEALEY concluded by saying that he would like to discuss how the fullor mooting arranged for the aftemoon of April 24th might be handled; it might be best to concentrate on the current financial year and on the period up to 1970/71, and to leave rather vaguer at this stage the period after 1970/71. Thoro was also the problen of the line to be taken with the Press both in Kuala Lumpur and in Singapore. It would be necessary, in addition, to have some consultation about the difficulties involved in the present intention of HMG to make an announcement of their policy some time in July.
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