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Mr. Stropool.e
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Mr. Hall
Trafford Smith
Please see the attached paper by the Secretary of State for Defence and preceding minutes. The paper and comments are required back by Mr. Reed by lunchtime on May 9.
2.
There are three consequences affecting the Pacific territories which would be involved in withdrawal from the mainland of Asia and of which the Secretary of State should be aware. All would also be involved, although to a much lesser degree, in the proposed reduction by half by 1970/71; all would be to some extent mitigated by the retention after the mid-1970s of some military capability for use in the Far East (presumably the establishment of a base in Australia would be one possible variant of this). The three consequences
are:-
(i)
(ii)
We should find it difficult to continue to carry conviction with the United States, Austrrite ond New Zealand as to our concern for the stability of the Pacific area, of our wish to coopers VG with them in securing this objective and of our intention of maintaining our responsibilities for our island dependencies in the area and of going relatively slowly in constitutional evolution towards ultimate goals other than independence. Our close cooperation with the United States, Australia and New Zealand on these matters is of very recent date and military withdrawal or reduction in the Far East nould well be seen as inconsistent with our declared intentions regarding our Pacific territċies,
Even though we should be able, so I understand, after 1970, to continue to carry out our responsibility for the maintenance of internal security in the Pacific territories by e reinforcement from this country, withdraw or reduction in the Far East would be bound shake confidence in our territories in our continuing concern for them and our continuing willingness and ability to secure stability in these territories. Particularly in Fiji it is not inconceivable that such a loss of confidence if it were serious, might itself have adverse consequences on the internal security situation end thus increase the risk that we might at some point have to intervene to deal with an internal security situation. In all our Pacific terri- tories our ability to defend and maintain internal security in them would become less credible,
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(iii) In relation to Tonga, we recently agreed in
discussions with the King that we would propose a revision of the Treaty of Friendship which would, broadly speaking, limit our responsibilities in relation to Tonga to defence and externe i affairs. Withdrawal or reduction in the Far East would make the retention of responsibility for defence by the U.K. less credible to the Tongans and, therefore, less attractive. It would therefore be likely to increase the King's known desire for complete independence at some point and/or make
/him
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