(c)
(a)
HUB 3/2/911
13.
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2.
a direct collision.
We must expect serious
trouble in Hong Kong in consequence and of course all its repercusions on Sino/British relations and position of British subjects in China.
no.
We would be violating all the assurances we have given the Chinese on this subject since April. Her Majesty's Government's statement of 13 April, which was of course agreed with Hong Kong, was that we do not object to study of Mao or anyone else provided it remains within the law. The rationale of Ministerial decision on Chung Wah was the same: peaceful education yes; violence
With general agreement we have repeatedly explained our position in these terms to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hong Kong have taken the same line (Hong Kong telegram No. 941 of 27 July). I was specifically invited (in Hong Kong telegram No. 976 of 9 August) to refer to Communist plan and applications for new schools and registrations granted so as to counter the accusation in Peking that we are actually suppressing "patriotic" education in Hong Kong. If we act as the Governor intends it will be clear that all these statements are meaningless. The Chinese will see them as false. We shall have given a clinching argument to extremists on Chinese side.
We would reverse the present trend of slight improvement in our relations with China. Chung Wah apart we have had a quieter time recently. The situation vis-a-vis Hong Kong Communists has been described as "not unfavourable" (Hong Kong telegram No. 928). It has proved possible to release detainees. It also proved possible to extricate staff of this Mission, though so far unhappily other British subjects have not benefitted. Moves are, however, under discussion which might secure or at least assist the release of Grey. All this would be sacrificed if we attack the Communists in the vital sector in Hong Kong. It must be stressed that there is a huge contradiction between overt and direct acts against Communist schools and what I have understood to be our policy of seeking an improvement in Sino/British relations.
Though this ground has been so recently and thoroughly gone over no reference to these considerations appears in the telegram under reference
The grounds on which Hong Kong intends making this change in policy and invites these serious consequences seems to be that certain sections of public opinion in Hong Kong are critical of Government policy on Communist education. I find it hard to follow the revolutions in Hong Kong public opinion. At the end of July the Hong Kong situation was described as not unfavourable and public opinion there as relaxed, making it harder to explain why concessions to the Communists were necessary (Hong Kong telegram 928). In any event I cannot believe public opinion wishes another full-dress crisis. It is normal that public opinion in a free society should express concern at possibility of expansion of Maoist education; it does not follow that this criticism is always well founded or in itself grounds for a serious change in Government policy. The public should presumably be encouraged to
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