0003160 G.. 316

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1

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3

(ii)

Non-Communist School Pupils

Arrests

Convictions

31

26

Pending

1

Acquitted

4

Types of offences:

Possession of real or fake bombs Possession of inflammatory posters Forming part of intimidating assembly Obstructing or assaulting the Police Trespass

Possession of fireworks

1 13

1

11

32

(iii)

Young Persons claiming to be students

Arrests

Convictions

Pending

Acquitted

11

11

Types of offences:

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

2

1

Possession of real or fake bombs Possession of inflammatory posters Forming part of intimidating assembly 8

Firmer action against the communist schools is likely to have the strong support of the local population, espcially if alternative schooling is made available to the former pupils.

Any action which can be interpreted as further denying or restricting the right to study or propagate Mao's Thoughts is likely to lead to stronger local communist reactions, perhaps in the form of more virulent propaganda, especially via mosquito sheets, more bomb-planting and demonstrations. It is thought that these local reactions could be contained though not without discomfort, since it is likely t at dismissed workers and affected students would be exhorted to participate. After many arrests, the extent of the disturbances would rapidly diminish.

The prison population is high. Arrests arising out of disturbances which would result from stronger action against communist schools would impose a further strain on firstly the courts and then the prisons.

Stronger action against communist schools would need to be timed bearing in mind action against the communist unions and the communist press.

Considerations

(a)

External Factors

Although there is no known C.P.G. involvement in local communist schools (they are sponsored and financed directly from local resources), when Peking or Canton is informed by the local communists of "the suppression of their supporters and the teachings of Chairman Mao" and "an escalation of events in Hong Kong", the leaders in Peking or Canton may see our action as a provocative challenge. There might be stronger repercussions such as protest notes, further action against the Mission in Peking, border troubles, the stoppage of food supplies, or the further encouragement of local disturbances.

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