Cypher/Cat A
SECRET
241
RIVED
IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno, 620
SECRET
2 July 1968
HWD 9/12
Addressed to F.0. telegram No. 620 of 2 July Repeated for information To:
Hong Kon
LAST
REF. 22
NEXT
REF.
Hong Kong telegrams Nos. 831 and 832: Chung Wan School.
26
I should like to comment on the important questions of principle raised in these telegrams.
2. The Governor states in telegram No. 832 that it is not enough to return to the situation as in April 1967 and that we must try to improve our position while undermining that of the Communists. If this is so, much of our correspondence since the Autumn of 1967 has been proceeding on a misunderstanding. I understood, and it has been stated in your telegrams, that we wished to get back to a modus vivendi and to normal working relations with the Chinese. On this understanding very best we can hope for is a return to April 1967 conditions. The Governor, however, apparently envisages continuing confrontation and measures of attrition directed against the Communists in an effort to get our position in Hong Kong to one which he would consider as suitable strength.
3. We must be clear about the implications of this. If it is accepted it means a basic change in our policy hitherto (so far as I have understood it); it is inconsistent with what we have told the Chinese, in particular Her Majesty's Government's statement of 13 April, which was agreed with Hong Kong; and rather than providing the basis for improving Sino-British relations it is likely to lead to even greater deterioration,
4.
HWB 3/2/180H8/2/442 VOCE.
Hiß
Even last December (see Hong Kong telegram No. 1820 of 5 December 1967) the Governor explained that his policy was to suppress vinience, rather than interfere in instruction in Thoughts of Mao, and to avoid provocative action. Now, when atmospher
Now, when atmospher is very much easier and opportunity seems to be present for a return to normality, we are asked to accept that we must move on to action which will certainly be provocative.
5. It is not clear what strength in Hong Kong would be considered satisfactory, e.g, how many Communist school: should we closed first. There will never be a really safe level. In event to think purely in terms of our strength in Hong Kong is mislead 20 The underlying safe- guard for Hong Kong is not our strength in the Colony, which will always be minute in relation to Chinese forces arrayed against it, but Chinese Government's current unwillingness, mainly for economic reasons, to push matters to extremes. But this agreement to live and let live requires two to make it work. If we show we are not interested by pressing for a position of illusory strength in Hong Kong, we endanger the main prop of the Colony which is Peking's tacit agreement to maintain co-existence.
༡་ /
6. In paragraph 8 of Hong Kong telegram No. 831 it is stated categori- cally, that no practicable concessions in Hong Kong will ever do any good locally though it is later stated that no one can be absolutely sure of Communist reaction). There is no account taken here of the
But even in the narrow wider aspects of our relations with China.
SECRET
/context