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not Community, policy, Britain would probably have a much freer
hand in invoking the G.A.T.T. on Hong Kong's behalf.
3. Mr. Cowperthwaite said that he accepted that the fact that
Britain would have the opportunity to influence Community
policy from the inside would be some compensation to Hong Kong
for any detriment arising from the loss of an effective voice in
in the G.A.T.T. on that policy. But he could not accept that
there would be no significant detriment from this. He felt
that Hong Kong's position would be weakened in the sort of
bilateral discussions referred to by Mr. Muir, both by the fact
that the sanction of G.A.T.T. procedures would no longer be
available against other members of the Community and by the fact
that Hong Kong's protector, Britain, might be seen to be
compelled, as a member of the Community, to act against Hong
Kong. Mr. Haddon-Cave added that while it would still be
possible for Britain to raise on Hong Kong's behalf in the
G.A.T.T. the national policies of another member of the Community,
she might well feel inhibited from doing so for political
reasons.
4°
As regards the G.A.T.T. provisions for retaliation where
G.A.T.T. rights were infringed, Mr. Muir confirmed that the
only permitted sanction against the infringement of Hong Kong's
rights was retaliation by Hong Kong. There could be no question
of retaliation by Britain on Hong Kong's behalf. This had
always been the case and so it was at least arguable that
whatever Britain had been able to achieve on Hong Kong's behalf
had been due as much to other factors as to the knowledge of
Hong Kong's ultimate G.A.T.T. rights, e.g. her persuasiveness
behind the scenes: presumably such factors would still hold if
we joined the Community. Mr. Cowperthwaite confirmed that it
was his understanding, too, that Britain could not retaliate in
G.A.T.TT. on Hong Kong's behalf.
5. Mr. Muir said that legally it would be a straightforward
matter to give Hong Kong her own voice in the G.A.T.T. by
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/granting