CONFIDENTIAL
(c)
taci
On
Hong Kong, this would be more advantageous that the mere acid acceptance by them of a unilateral declaration on our part about our own continuing responsibilities. the other hand, the more responsibility we try to thrust on the Six, the more likely they are to object to the whole concept of a declaration. One theoretical possibility would be to ask for a joint declaration in the first instance, but be ready to fall back on the idea of a unilateral declaration if we encountered strong opposition. The danger in this tactic, of course, is that the Six would be more suspicious of what lay behind a unilateral declaration, if it were suggested after a proposal for a joint declaration had fallen to the ground, than if it had been suggested in the first place.
If there were to be a declaration, should it relate only to Hong Kong, or to U.K. Dependent Territories generally? Here, much would depend on whether the declaration was to be joint or unilateral. If it was to be joint, the Six would be likely to prefer to limit its application as far as possible, and therefore to press for it to be related to Hong Kong alone. They would have strong grounds for arguing on these lines, as they would probably in a position to say that they were making special arrangements for all other British Dependent Territories anyway, So their problems were cared for. The Chinese might not be pleased by a Community declaration on Hong Kong;
but we
would probably have to choose between irritating them in this way and giving up the prospect of a joint declaration. If, on the other hand, the declaration were to be unilateral, the Six, if they agreed to it being made at all, would no doubt be willing to give us a somewhat freer hand as regards
its substance.
19. In short, it is recommended that we should make it clear to Hong Kong officials on the foregoing lines that their suggestion seems fraught with very grave difficulties. If they continued to press it upon us, we could however agree to submit it to U.K. Ministers;
decision.
but we should not attempt in any way to forecast their
THE EFFECT OF U.K. ENTRY INTO THE E.E.C. ON HONG KONG'S PREFERENTIAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH HER COMMONWEALTH TRADING PARTNERS OTHER THAN BRITAIN.
20.
There were two points here:
(a) Hong Kong is worried about the implications of U.K. entry
to the E.E.C., and the change in the pattern of Commonwealth trading arrangements which this implies, the preferences which she now enjoys in New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore, Jamaica and Trinidad.
CONFIDENTIAL
on
/(6)