1
doubt to accept the proposition that treaties with China
involving the transfer of territory are all "unequal"},
The ceded areas of Hong Kong could not be viable separated
from the main industrial areas in the New Territories;
the fretier in Kowloon would be impossible to control;
all the sea end air approaches could be claimed an under
de iure Chinese control as well being under their da
facto control. Continued retention of these areas woulé
sake no sense, either econcaically or politically.
Timing of a negotiated withärgusă
25. A number of relevant factors have been noted in this
repert. As argued in Section D, genuine negotiations
gould not be mounted in present conditions in Chine and we
cannot toro when these may be more favourable.
If we
Bought now to hand the Colony back we could not do so with
any hope of discharging our obligations and responsibilities
towards its people or of salvaging any appreciable portion
of our assets;
er
and there could be serious dams, gre
relations with our allies.
other end of the time
ie determined by the strong probability that publie
s future will start to slip and
confidence in the Colony's future will
the economy to rundown in the 1980s; it would become a
serious liability to us and it would lose its value to
Chine. Al
All this points to an initiative on our part taken
not later than the early 1980s and as soon as there emergen
in China a regine with which we might be able to do
business and which all our allies would be prepared to
countenance » avoiding, however,
avoiding, however, any time whenI
(a) The Hong Kong economy is showing weakness;
(b)
we are under any form of Chinese pressure
either from within or without the Colony,
There are also factors indicating that we should take the
first opportunity that favourable circumstances offer.
/The growth ...
Page 195Page 196