polday, their reaction might vary from en
wccupromising statement of their terms if they
wanted to extricts propogonds and prontigo
advantage to a ressonable negatisting posture if
they are Erminaty anxiouns for dconomie
non
reasons, to take on; Fons over with minimum
darayu to the economy.
(p) The atrongth of our negotiating position.
In
th rompact mo oro 11tely to be in the host
position if we seek to withdraw voluntarily when
gonditions are more or lees norasl, in a lesa
10ory ponttton it to try then conditiona
in Hong Kong are diffimalt (e.g. beesuse of
economic decline) and in the worst possible
position 10 20 30 00 under Shine Prana
Our Sorotiating Position
21.
Tho woolnean of our negotluting ponition is that we
have meny tontogon in Hong Kong in teran or people and
assets, a substantial proportion of which we shell find it
very difficult (if not impossible) to sore.
ourse)
have no nonna of bringing sintential nroosure to boss
on Chino+ Cur trudo rith hon is not alcnlrloants
Export AI 261thor vltok nor irreplaceable from other
Our military capability (including nuclear
aapability) coula hardly be a factor in a nituation in
particularly nincs China's assessment is probably that we
tooooont to
ould not so it even in desonce of Hong Kong against
woo
22. The strength of cur negotiating position lies in the
economia vodne of Hong Kong to China se e source of foreig
exchange Car strongest card would be the possibility
of handing over a buoyant Hong Kong economy for which ve
/ could