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leadership appear to be genuinely convinced that the Americans wish to attack China and, despite their propaganda about nuclear weapons being "papor tigers", there is little doubt that they take seriously the threat of a massive nuclear attack. Although
this fear does not prevent China from pursuing policies of
hostility towards the United States it does seem to prevent them from pushing these policies to the point of direct confrontation, It is therefore arguable that the Chinese could be deterred from taking action against Hong Kong by the threat of American retaliation against China. It is, however, probably true that they would only be deterred in this way from military actions against Hong Kong which could be clearly defined as "Chinese aggression". It is much less likely that a deterrent of this sort could put an end to the incitement to subversion in Hong Kong, since the Chinese would calculate, quite correctly, that
there is no point at which such subversion can be considered as
the justification for nuclear retaliation against China. 46. The Americans would like us to stay in Hong Kong for as long as possible because of Hong Kong's value for intelligence purposes and its political value as a Free World enclave on the mainland of
China. For domestic as well as international reasons, however,
they would be very unlikely to be willing to give a public nuclear guarantee for Hong Kong nor for our own reasons would we wish them to do so. There is, however, advantage in trying to make the Chinese believe that the Americans are involved in or committed
to the defence of Hong Kong. The continued presence of American warships in Hong Kong is helpful in this connection.
G. WITHDRAWAL
47. Hong Kong's geographical position, its preponderantly Chinese population, the artificial nature of its economic and political base these factors, coupled with China's declared claims and intentions, indicate that the Colony's future must inevitably lie at some stage within China and that we must give up our position
there. We therefore turn to consideration of the circumstances (short of an abrupt military take-over) in which this union with China might come about; the major problems that would arise; the possibilities open to us to withdraw; and the prospects of our reaching a negotiated solution.
The Circumstances
48.
We might reach an entirely voluntary decision that the best course would be to withdraw. This could be the case in the
following situations:-
(a)
The emergence in China of a more moderate "revisionist" regime; this, as pointed out in Section E, is highly
unlikely in the near future.
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/ (b) ...