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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE INPUT TO OPDO(DR)(68)5(REVISE)
1. X Military
2.
17. In the unlikely event of an outright Chinese military invasion we could not defend Hong Kong and evacuation from the Colony is likely to be a very difficult, if not impracticable operation. However, the role of the forces is to assist the Hong Kong Government in maintaining internal security, deterring, by their presence any precipitate action by the Chinese, and identifying aggression in the event of an armed Chinese attack. To do this we maintain in Hong Kong a garrison of the order of six to seven major units. A garrison of this size is acceptable whilst there is a reinforcement capability within the Far East Theatre. No Royal Air Force aircraft, other than support helicopters, are stationed in the Colony but aircraft make periodic visits to establish a measure of control over local air space. One frigate and two coastal minesweepers are maintained in the Colony on a rotational basis from Singapore.
18. At a time when we are reducing our other commitments and forces East of Suez, it is important to maintain confidence in the Colony in our intention to maintain our position there. Certainly we must not give the Chinese the impression that we were preparing to leave. Because of the political decision to withdraw our forces from Singapore/Malaysia at some stage it will become impossible to continue to provide support and backing for Hong Kong from the theatre. An internal security situation could arise and get rapidly out of control, and as our garrison will then be at the end of a long line of communi- cations its effective and timely reinforcement would be dependant on adequate warning, availability of an air route, overflying permission and the absence of any other concurrent major operation. We cannot be certain that all these con- ditions will emerge in our favour and it will therefore be necessary for us to make a modest increase in the permanent strength of the forces to meet our responsibilities.*
Insert additional Conclusion:
$
19.
cost of time forces we shall forces
ich the
is estimated
t to
from
The full budgetan. need to maintain in Hong Kong after 1971
вве bobe £25 million (excluding the cost of any
a small wad of fighition awerauft, the provisiem which is under examination). In cana
Curently
and Service
Hong Kong d of 75 million per annum
contributes to defence at the vorte
Which runs
In der
until March 1971.
1971. X
an agreement
ad it tationed
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