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Emergency Evacuation
17.
If we lose control of the situation, and, assuming an orderly with- drawal is impossible and a Macao-type situation unacceptable, we shall be forced to embark on an emergency withdrawal. This would confront us with sone formidable problems. The numbers of people for whom we are respons- ible and should evacuate are very large. Our military assessment is that wo could hold on for no more than 48 hours against strong Chinese military pressure, although a longer period is conceivable if the only threat posed is of internal disorder. Internal disorder on a scale substantial enough to lead to our starting to evacuate the Colony would undoubtedly encourage Chinese "volunteers" to cross the border in large numbers; in such circum- stances it would be extremely unlikely that we could hold out for long. In the circumstances in which withdrawal was necessary, airlines would probably not be operating through Hong Kong and few ships would be calling. Arrangements would have to be made for requisitioning ships and aircraft. The Americans, whose warships frequently visit Hong Kong, could be of great assistance, but we feel that because of the risk of a leak we should not now seek to plan jointly with them. In the face of a sharp deterioration in the situation it would, however, be necessary to do so.
18. There would be great difficulties in placing any significant number of Chinese whom we were able to evacuate. We could not take many into this country; Anerica and Canada might take significant numbers and some
Taiwan would no South American countries might offer special facilities.
doubt take quite a large number. We cannot, however, talk to any of these countries in advance. There are also a number of difficult economic and financial questions to consider in the event of an emergency
evacuation.
Planning
19. Despite all these difficulties, wo fool that it is essential that contingency plans for evacuation should be drawn up in advance as soon as
It is vital that possible. This, howevor, poses a major difficulty.
there should be no leak about the preparation of contingency plans for withdrawal. The whole situation in Hong Kong turns on the morale and confidence of the local population, and in particular of the Chinese police. Once local support and confidence is lost, the situation could deteriorate overnight. Once we are seen to be making any move which could be interpreted as preparatory towards withdrawal, our control would effect- ively be lost. This means that, in our opinion, the existence of any contingency plan for evacuation must not become known to anyone in Hong Kong, save the acting Governor and the Commander, British Forces, and we are advised that it should not become known also to Far East Headquarters in Singapore, save only for the Commander-in-Chief.
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