HONG K NG
26 July,1967
58)
hen we met on the 20th July t fin lise the report which
Is very emerged as DO(DI.) (67) 48 we vere pressed for time. grateful for the consi.er tion that na given on that occasion to a minority view, but I wonder if we had had more time whether we might not have eventually agreed on a par graph 16 which went more like the follo: ing:-
The present attitude of the Chinese Government towards foreign ffairs does not owever, seen to be governed by rtional or economic cosi er tions, and it is even do btf:l whether they are in control of the mainland opposite Hong Kong. The prospects, therefore, of achieving any bargain which would give time for a mesure of orderliness in or withdrawal are exceɛdingly slight; and most of us believe that to attempt negotiations of any sort world add to our humiliation without
It can be argued, however, sufficient countervailing advantage.
that bad though the prospects of negotiat on would be an onergancy evacuation would in any case expose us to a high degree of loss and humilistion, and that we would be bound to try anything in our power (if not through our own contacts which might have ceased - then through an intermediary such as
It Pakistan) to buy time for salvaging lives if not goods. follows that emergency planting (see below) should include a careful study of any tactics open to us to improve the order iness of withdrawal through negotiation (even if abortive) with the Chinese authorities.
I am not of course Buesting any redrafting of the report, which is now on its way through Kinisters; but I have thought out th formul tion because I think it sho s that there may not be an much between us as we had supposed. In fact, I believe that as the studies mentioned in paragrashs 20 and 21 progress it will seem quite natural for us to give a continuin, look to the possibilitics of tactics w ich would bring an emergency evacuation a little closer to the c tegory of an orderly withdrawal,
I am o pying this to Galsworthy (Commonwealth Of. ice), Bancroft and Hackay (Treasury), Sykes and Bolland (Foreign Office), Cper (101), and Darlington (Board of Tr: os),
P. Rogers Esq., C.B., c.r.G.,
Cabinet Crrice,
0..1.
(11.1. Jenkyns)
TOF BECKET