NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
B. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF OUR
1.
POSITION IN HONG KONG
Military. To assist the Hong Kong Government
in maintaining internal security and control of the
frontier and to identify aggression in the event of
an armed Chinese attack, we are obliged to maintain
in Hong Kong a garrison of the order of six to seven
major units. There are no Royal Air Force aircraft
stationed in the Colony. Naval forces consist of
two coastal minesweepers and a frigate, We have in
Capability addition to maintain a reinforcement capacity. The L
direct annual cost of maintaining these forces in
Hong Kong is about £16 million to which Hong Kong
contributes £5 million. ✈
2. The effective reinforcement of the garrison
might not be possible if the internal security
situation got out of control as a result of
pressure from China, including possibly a mass influx
from China into the Colony; nor could we reinforce it
Chinese
an
effectively in face of outright invasion. As
indicated in our Interim Report, evacuation from the
Colony is likely to be a very difficult, if not
In the Colony
impracticable, operation. Our forces there are
thereafter
accordingly at serious riskif The Chiere dende to take over.
3. At a time when we are reducing our other
commitments and forces east of Suez, we are
precluded from making any major reduction in our
forces in Hong Kong. Any significant decrease there
would seriously affect confidence in the Colony
by casting doubt upon our intention to maintain our
position there and might also be interpreted by China
as an indication that we were preparing to leave.
With the planned withdrawal of our forces from
/Singapore/Malaysia,