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COLONIAL
OFFICE
E. ARE THERE ANY MEANS OF FRUSTRATING CHINA'S INTENTIONS?
1.
A United Nations Solution.
If a separate status could be found for
Hong Kong, indopendont of Britain or China, wo would have done what wo
could to protect the non-Communist population of Hong Kong from forcible
"liboration". At the same time the difficul tics over constitutional
advance would be romoved.
2. It is perhaps not altogether beyond the bounds of possibility that
somo status may eventually be found for Formosa involving a neutralisod
solf-govorning island, conceivably under United Nations guarantoc. If this
should over come about, it might bo to our advantago to sook a similar
solution for Hong Kong.
3. Another possibility, in the event of a serious move by China against
Hong Kong, would be to romit the question to the United Nations and work for
a Danzig-type settlement in which the territory would be placed under United
Nations administration.
4. It is most unlikely, however, that China would agroo to cithor of those solutions. Successive Chinese Governments have rogarded Hong Kong as Chinoso territory to be rocovered in due course. The present Chinoso
Government is almost cortain to dony that the Thited Nations has any standing
in the question: it has on a number of pocasions in a United Nations
context nado it cloar, through Communist Mombor States of the United Nations,
that the future of Hong Kong is not a mattor for the United Nations but
rests between China and Britain.
5. We consider bolow whether there are any noans of bringing prossuro
to boar on China to accopt a United Nations solution.
6.
Economic Sanctions. An economic onbargo on trade with China c.g.
of the kind operated during the Korean War could, while China romains at
loggorhoads with Russia and other countrics of the Soviet bloc, bo
extremely effective. But it does not soom at all likely that, for the sako
of Hong Kong, we could sccure the agrooment of the free world to mount such
an onbargo. France for one would probably refuse to fall in linc. Thoro
would be other countries who would be reluctant to join in on the grounds
that they do not mix trado with politics. Thore could in any case bo no
certainty that economic isolations would drive China to its knees. If the
ombargo was really effectivo, Hong Kong would cease to have any economic
value to China. The risk would be that a China driven in on itself in
this way would be a more dangerous and determined noighbour and would not hositato to take over Hong Kong.
7. American Involvement.
To be distributed at Meeting]
18th August, 1967.
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