8
from protozt for bringing pollos or troops in to doal
with a difficult or deteriorating situation. They
o uno hoir position to limit our withdrawal or
pormone and onsets, to the extent that they considered
LABONGRAY to retain hostsgon" in order to acuo
CHO MARIMURAdvantez mnt of us, both totoro and
after our departure. This is a course it would seem
prudent to follow only in oxtaeniar to offer it
oarlor would cadoubtedly put 11rlotibio
in their way.
The prospooto tant China would rampond with
ronoonsable horneo of cooperation to a movO OUT
part for a negotiated withdrawal must dopand very
sch ONL
(a)
whether toultod their policy at tha
one
to take the colony over IP & 委
tholr "intorast woe in nothing it took. If
ohogo time that did not out either their
econorde or politionl objectives, we could expect
thor to mazlaino their donanda upon un and to
Book to ano that we Ioft in utter nontuson and
in the mont huntintine confit one.
drawal did anit their policy, their reaction might
a
very from að meompromising statement of their
termo ir they wanted to extract a propagande and
oroetico advantage to a noasonable negoti:.ting
powtuso if they were gonuinoly anxious, for
economio nonono, to take Hong Kong over with
ngs to tho ooonomy.
(h) The strength of our negotiating position. In
this respect we are likely to be in the best
position if we seek to withdraw voluntarily when
conditions are more or loss normal, in a loss
astiefactory position if we try whon conditions in
Hong Kong are difficult (e.g. because of economic
/decline
TEL