C
interim period of dual \nglo-Chinese control of
the Colony.
16. It is most unlikely that Chine would merely
soquiosos in our withdrawal at our own speed and in our
Given the attitude of suoneesive Chinese
Own Way,
Governments to our tenure the Colony and to
foreign Governments in general, they are likely to want
to make our loss and discomfiture as grant as possible.
Nor in it within our power, by military force, to
hold them off while we make the nece88÷ry
*angements.
We would need time (probably not less than six montha) ·
to deal with certain of the problems we would faco.
his factor and the very nature of some of those
problems (particularly the mintenmaes of internal
security) indicates the need to reneh sons understanding
or afringement with China.
17. It is perhaps arguable that we could achieve the
best conditions for withdrawal, in all the circumstances,
by offering to associate the Chinese Government with
the administration of the territory during a hending-
over period. On the face of it, this could have the
merit of frustrating the woret Chinese intentione end
might prove to be the only way in which we could affect
en orderly withdrawal in the face of uncompromising
Chinese hostility end opposition.
But as a courne to
be ursued deliberately, even in a situation where the
Chinese are showing a spirit of reasonable co-operation,
it carries emo great dengers.
At any
a position within
Ime they would be able
the administration, the Chinese would have an infinite
capacity to interfere.
to instigate trouble among their supporters and then to
humper or frustrate our efforts to deal with it. If
they were not already represented in the security forces
an part of the arrangement, they would possess a cast-
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