TOP SECRET
6
16-17
freedom of action (see paragr pha below).
14. The second major problem will be the maintenance
of internal security. Fubllo knowledge that we vere
preparing to withdmw would have an imediate and
profound effect on the internal security situstion.
Those fearful of the change of regime would be
olamouring to get mat; ogremiats would get to work
on a nonfuged public and rally their sympathisers whose
numbora would mushroom ovomight among those (the
majortly) of the population who would see no
alternative but to remain; they would be joined by
criminal and hooligan elements. The morales of the
Police Foros would dip sharply (if it did not
disintegrute altogether); the Force is preponderantly
Chinese and they would understandably be looking over
their shoulders. The task of maintaining public order
might devolve entirely on the garrison and the
likelihood is that it will prove impossible to do mo
throughout the whole nres of the Colony; this would
undoubtedly be the case if the Chinese Government
deliberately set out to foment the situation.
nature of this problem points to the need for note
understanding with the Chinese about our withdrawal
with a view to their exercising some control, direct
or indirect, over their supporters and sympathiserB.
e return to this point in paragraphs (6-17
15. Bodas of Bithdrawal. We could set about
implementing a decision to withdraw by
(i) unilateral action, declaring our intention
to go in a specified period of tim0 - with or
without an indication of our rendinoes to talk
to the Chinese about it;
(11) approaching the Chinams with an offer to
negotiate our withdrawal. This might include
(but not initially) an offer to consider an
TOP SECRET
/interim