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E.
1.
COLONIAL
OFFICE
ARE THERE ANY MEANS OF FRUSTRATING CHINA'S INTENTIONS?
A United Nations Solution. If a soparato statue could be found for
Hong Kong, indopendent of Britain or China, wo would have dono what wo
could to protect the non-Communist population of Hong Kong from forcible
"liboration". At the same time tho difficul tics over constitutional
advanco would be romoʻrod.
2. It is perhaps not altogether beyond tho bounds of possibility that
sono status may ovontually bo found for Formosa involving a noutralised
solf-govorning island, conceivably under United Nations guarantoo. If this
should over como abou, it might bo to our advantago to sook a similar solution for Hong Kong. But there is no real prospect that the problem of Formosa could be solved in this way.
3.
Another possibility, in the event of a serious move by China against
Hong Kong, would be to romit the question to tho United Nations and work for
a Danzig-typo sottlompnt in which the territory would be placed under United
Nations administration.
4. It is most unlikely, howovor, that China would agroo to either of thoso solutions. Successivo Chinoso Govornmonts have rogardod Hong Kong as
Chinose territory to be rocovored in due courso. The prosont Chinoso
Government is almost cortain to deny that the United Nations has any standing
in tho question: it has on a number of occasions in a United Nations
context made it clear, through Communist Momber States of the United Nations,
that tho futuro of Hong Kong is not a matter for the United Nations but rosts botwoon China and Britain. Any change in this attitude is inconceivable in The foreseeable future.
5. We considor below who thor thoro aro any moans of bringing prossuro
to boar on China to accept a United Nations solution.
6.
Economic Sanctions. An oconomic onbargo on trado with China o.g.
of the kind operated during the Korean War could, while China romains at
loggorhoads with Russia and other countrios of tho Soviot bloc, bo
oxtromoly offoctivo. But it does not soom at all likely that, for the sako
of Hong Kong, wo could secure the agreement of the free world to mount such
an cnbargo. France for one would probably rofuse to fall in linc. There
would bo other countrios who would be reluctant to join in on the grounds
that they do not mix trado with politics. Thore could in any case bo no
cortainty that economic isolations would drive China to its knoos. If tho
ombargo was really offcctivo, Hong Kong would coaso to have any economic
valuo to China. The risk would be that a China driven in on itself in
this way would be a moro dangorous and determined noighbour and would not hositato to tako ovor Hong Kong.
American Involvement
To be distributed at Meeting
18th August, 1967.
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