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control of Hong Kong and they would then doubtless be very long and
Indication
tortuous. There is the further point that any/aim to the Chinese that we were contemplating negotiation and withdrawal would be the signal for an increase in pressure. This was precisely the situation in Macao which
produced disastrous consequences for the Portuguese.
6. Although the Cultural Revolution is likely to continue for some time,
probably well into next year, it will not last forever. We cannot predict with any certainty what will follow. But eventually after Mao's death or his departure from the political scone it is possible that a more orthodox and
pragmatic government will emerge. This might well take the form of an
authoritarian Party or military rule. Its first task would be to re-assert
oehtral control, assuming that the confusion resulting from the Cultural
Revolution still persisted. They would, however, be unlikely to reverse China's general policy of hostility towards the Woat. But ovor a period hostility night gradually be modified as has happened in the Soviet Union. We believe that such a process would take some time (probably docades rather than yoars). During this period such a governmont might bo prepared to
tolorate Hong Kong's oxistonoo while more pressing internal problems wore solved, but it is unlikely that it could make such an open gesture towards colonialism as re-negotiating the lease of the New Territories when it expires in 1997. It night, however, be possible at some stage before then to negotiate an orderly withdrawal from Hong Kong.
7. There is an alternative possibility that the Cultural Revolution
will ond in the disintegration of China into regional groupings acting independently of the central government. Such a situation could occur without any formal declaration of indepondonco and would be reminiscent of the warlord poriod in the 1930s. Under such conditions it is conceivable that Kwangtung night fall under the control of a local leader propared to act independently of Peking. In such circumstancos, it might be possible to negotiate with this leader eother to assure the continued existence of Hong Kong (which would be of great economic benefit to Kwangtung) or for an orderly withdrawal. We considor that this is a possibility which must be
borne in mind but that it does not at prosent seem to be a likely outcome
of the Cultural Revolution.
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