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3.
10.
a course which should be taken at once if damage
is to be minimized. To be forced into it slowly
is the worst answer, and in either case, in future, the situation would be as in para 7.
(b) would be a suitable course only if para 4(d) is the correct situation; and this is the least likely. In that paragraph, if (a) is correct, this course is pointless; and if (b) or (c) is correct, it would be precisely the wrong
course of action to take. It has the further disadvantage of making it certain that the quite remarkable public support we have at present would dribble away.
) remains, therefore, as the course with the
highest potential for success. Nor do the risks appear to be noticeably worse although they may be more immediate.
Precisely how we follow course (c) of para 8 naturally requires careful thought. Its aim should be, however, to keep the local CPG leadership busy, sustain public morale, and damage them in ways which are as little likely as possible to enable them to appeal successfully to the public (including their own rank and file).
The UK's attitude
11.
This is crucial: any suggestion of lack of UK support and public morale (our strongest and virtually only political weapon at present) will very quickly collapse.
12.
It is also, in my present view, of the greatest importance that the UK make it clear that the
Hong Kong Government, in my person, is not authorized to do any deals on the UK's behalf.
This is a pressure point.
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