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or
of defence around the airport (Kai Tak, on Kowloon Peninsula),
more probably Stanley, on Victoria Island, taking with us those non- Chinese who wished to stay with us (and could do so), and those
Chinese who were so committed to us that they had no choice but to
throw in their lot completely with us. Once we had reached this
position the physical problems of extricating ourselves would be
such that, unless the Americans were prepared to help us with both
military and logistic support, we would have no option but to try
to open negotiations of some sort with Peking, or the local
Communist leaders acting under Peking's orders. And since we would
have been clearly seen to have been defeated, we could hardly expect
any terms better than capitulation.
9. We considered with the Governor and the C. B. F. the point referred to in paragraph 4(c) of this minute, viz. whether it would
be possible to avoid these extremes by seeking to negotiate a with-
drawal on the best terms we could get once it became clear that we
were going to be beaten. This point would be reached once it became clear that (i) Peking had formed a definite intention to drive us out altogether, or (ii) possibly without Peking having
taken any such deliberate decision, the Hong Kong police had reached the point of collapse and public opinion in Hong Kong had ceased to
believe that we could stay there. The Governor and the C.B.F. both
felt that, while in such circumstances we should obviously have to be ready to exploit any opportunity there might be of negotiating an
orderly withdrawal, the likelihood of our being able to do so would
be very remote; for once we indicated that we were willing to withdraw, public opinion in Hong Kong would swing violently against
us, and it would then be easy for the Communists rapidly to under- mine the security situation precisely in order to humiliate us and force us to capitulate.
10. We tried to assess with the Governor and the C. B. F. the
magnitude of the problem if, contrary to our expectations, we were able to negotiate an orderly withdrawal. Of the total population of nearly four million, probably about a half are citizens of the U.K. and Colonies. The overwhelming majority of these would have to be
left to their fate. Large numbers of them would no doubt accommodate themselves to the new regime. But many would suffer. Apart from
the British forces and their families (numbering together some 30,000), we should presumably also have to try to ensure that of the non-Chinese residents (about 47,000, of whom some 31,000 originate from Commonwealth countries) those who wished to do so were able to leave the Colony when the British administration was withdrawn. Finally, the Governor's very rough estimate is that
there are about 20,000 Chinese in Hong Kong for whom we should have
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to