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THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DISPARINANT UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958
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and on more than one occasion they took steps to moderate the activities of their local supporters in Hong Kong. But with the intensification of the fighting in Vietnam and above all the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, there arose a note of uncertainty about Peking's attitude towards Hong Kong and intermittant protests about the way we were allowing the Americans to use it as a "military base"
Our preliminary thinking in London before our visit had been on
the lines that
4.
5.
(a) we could not in any circumstances accept a Macau-type
(b)
(c)
(1)
compromise;
if Peking turned on the pressure to a point beyond which it became intolerable, we should have to seek to withdraw from the Colony;
our aim should therefore be
(i) to identify as early as possible the point at which
(ii)
(iii)
it would become clear to us that there was no
alternative to withdrawal;
having done so, to try to negotiate our withdrawal in as orderly a manner as possible;
to define what our principal objectives should be if we had to negotiate a withdrawal.
But our discussion in Hong Kong led us to conclude
that in practice we do not now have a real option to withdraw from the Colony: we are in fact trapped there,
and have no alternative but to sweat it out;
(2) if Peking decided to make an all out effort to bring us to our knees in Hong Kong, the chances of our then being able
to negotiate our withdrawal from the Colony with any semblance of orderliness or dignity would be virtually nil; we should rather have to face a humiliating capitulation.
The reasoning behind these conclusions is as follows.
6. Our reading of the situation is that Peking do not at present wish to drive us out of Hong Kong, but would prefer us to remain for the time being because of Hong Kong's economic value to China (which would at least be dramatically reduced if China were to absorb Hong Kong). Of course, Peking would like to put us in the same position as the Portuguese in Macau, which is one of complete subservience to her wishes. We would then, for example, be forced to deny completely the use of Hong Kong to the U.S. armed services,
to exclude the K.M. T. (perhaps handing over their local leaders to Communist China), and to return any of the refugees whom Peking might specify. Another aspect of Peking's attitude is a desire to humiliate Britain in order to repay us for the humiliations we are held to have inflicted on China in the past when we were the dominant power,
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SROR BT
7.