this the Chinese mean that they are prepared for
time being to
tolerate Britain's retention of the territory provided it is not used
in a way inimical to their interests and position, both in the short
and long term. Informal Chinese warnings have indicated ways in
which we might be regarded as eltering the "status quo* 9.g. by the abdication of our responsibilities through constitutional advancement
of the territory, by permitting the Americans to use it as a base in
the Vietnam War.
13.
Chinese foreign policy is essentially pragmatio. Provided
that its control remains in the hands of a strong central administration, it is to be expected that no move for the recovery of Hong Kong will
be made while the Colony, in our possession, continuas te be valuable to them. But if the Colony acts, develops or is used in a way inimical to major Chinese interests, we coul not be sure that
economic considerations or fear of an American recotion would prevail.
And if they see as preparing to abandon our interests there, they will nove quickly to take our place. Through their influence over labour and other organisations, they could at any time cause serious disturbances in liong Kong, which would serve as a pretaxt for inter- vention for the purpose of restoring order. This, rather than frontal attack, is likely to be the means by which they would proceed to take
possession of the territory.
Future of Hong Kong
14 The Chinese attitude towards the Colony precludes teking any steps which imply that Hong kong could have a future other than
reincorporation with Chine. To ignore that attitude would be likely to precipitate Chinese demands for the return of the Colony. It is therefore not possible to set the Colony along the normal progression towards self-government and independence, goals that are both irreconcilable with Chinese claims to the territory; nor would China accept any attempt by us, through the Uniteɑ Nations (of which it is not a member), to find some separate "international" status for the Colory.
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