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which a Hong Kong administered as Macau is now might bring them, and decide to inflict on us the supreme humiliation of forcing us out of Hong Kong in circumstances of total capitulation (in such circumstances Poking might again decide that sufficient hostages must remain in Hong Kong to ensure, for example, that we handed over all Hong Kong's storling balances to China). But so long as Mao Tse-Tung dominates China it soens extremely unlikely that Peking would be willing to co-operate with us in permitting us to effect an orderly withdrawal from the Colony; and such a withdrawal would only be possible with the co-operation of the Chinesc.
8: Both the Governor and the C.B.F. feel certain that such co-
operation would not be forthcoming, and therefore discount entirely the possibility of an orderly negotiated withdrawal on our part, at least for the time being. We had no grounds for taking a rosier view of the situation. One can only guess at the circumstances in which it would become clear that, to put it bluntly, we were licked. But the most likely situation would appear to be one in which the Communists in Hong Kong, with the backing of Peking, had decided on all-out confrontation, and had pursued the policy with vigour and determination to the extent that the security forces (both police and British troops) had reached exhaustion and had still not been able to restore, and maintain, law and order. Once this point had been reached the morale of the police would crack, and so would the morale of the public (it must be remembered that in an all-out confrontation there could well be Chinese troop demonstrations at the frontier, accompanied by Red Guard incursions across the border). There would be a swing of public opinion in Hong Kong against us; and that, coupled with sustained pressure from Peking, would lead to a quick collapse of our position in Hong Kong. Probably the best we could then do would be to try to fall back on to perimeter zones of defence around the airport (Kai Tak, on Kowloon Peninsula), or more probably Stanley, on Victoria Island, taking with us those non-Chinese who wished to stay with us (and could do so), and those Chinese who were so committed to us that they had no choice but to throw in their lot completely with us. Once we had reached this position the physical problems of extricating ourselves would be such that, unless the Americans were prepared to help us with both military and logistic support, we would have no option but to try to open negotiations of some sort with Peking, or the local Cormunist leaders acting under Peking's orders. And since we would have been clearly seen to have been defeated, we could hardly expect any terms better than capitulation.
9.
We considered with the Governor and the C.B.F. the point referred to in paragraph 4(c) of this minute, viz. whether it would be possible to avoid these extremes by seeking to negotiate a withdrawal on the best terms we could get once it became clear that we were going to be beaten. This point would be reached once it became clear that (i) Peking had formed a definite intention to drive us out altogether, or (ii) possibly without Peking having taken any such deliberate decision, the Hong Kong police had reached the point of collapse and public opinion in Hong Kong had ceased to believe that we could stay there. The Governor and the C.B.F. both felt that, while in such circumstances we should obviously have to be ready to exploit any opportunity there might be of negotiating an orderly withdrawal, the likelihood of our being able to do so would be very remote; for once we indicated that we were willing to withdraw, public opinion in Hong Kong would swing violently against us, and it would then be easy for the Communists rapidly to undermine the security situation precisely in order to humiliate us and force us to capitulate.
10.
We tried to assess with the Governor and the C.B.F. the magnitude of the problem if, contrary to our expectations, wo were able to negotiate
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