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(22/4
Reference: DS22/9B
HONG KONG
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION TO
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE DRAFT
Until recently the Army had 62/3 major units in Hong Kong .(1)
which, with supporting units, totalled about 7,300 British and Gurkha troops; there are also about 1,300 locally enlisted personnel in the Colony. A further Gurkha battalion has now been moved temporarily to Hong Kong. There are no RAF aircraft normally stationed in the Colony. The Royal Navy is represented by two coastal minesweepers and a frigate.
2. The garrison has three purposes; to assist the Hong Kong government maintain order, to help the civil authorities control the frontier and to identify aggression in the event of an armed Chinese attack.
3. In any internal security situation the Hong Kong government could normally be expected to defer the direct involvement of troops as long as possible. Nevertheless in serious disturbances the garrison, even if not called on, is essential as moral support for the Hong Kong police and as a visible guarantee of our inten- tion to control the situation. In the event of grave internal disorders most of the garrison might have to be retained for internal security tasks leaving only a small force available for the frontier. This would be a calculated risk as Chinese pressure at the border might accompany disturbances in Hong Kong.
4. In its froutier role the garrison can assist the police to stem an influx of refugees or to control incursions by trouble- makers. It can counter limited military threats and would thus compel hostile forces to deploy and mount a clearly recognisable attack in order to invade the Colony. The garrison could not, however, defend Hong Kong against a deliberate invasion. The Chinese are estimated to have an army (41,000 men) within easy reach of Hong Kong. They have a further army plus an artillery division (57,000 men) within 200 miles. They could also command the air.
5.
We have detailed plans for the reinforcement of Hong Kong by air and sea from Singapore/Malaysia, but these would probably be executed only while the situation was still under control or perhaps, in some circumsta
tances, to cover a withdrawal.
6. We should be unlikely to be able to reinforce effectively if the internal situation got out of control as a result of increased pressure from Feking, including possibly a mass influx from China into the Colony: nor could we reinforce effectively in face of outright invasion. If internal security collapsed circumstances would not favour evacuation. It is unlikely that military resistance could then prevent or much delay a Chinese take-over, after which the Chinese would be able to dictate highly unfavourable terms of surrender.
(1)
10th July 1967
2 British battalions, 3 Gurkha battalions, 1 light regiment of artillery, 1 armoured car squadron, 1 field engineer squadron (Gurkha)
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