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abandonment of large numbers of loyal Chinese.
Though there might be some
tactical considerations in favour of acceptance of the Macao situation for a limited period (the arguments on both sides might be set out) the general view of the Working Party was that this would not be a tolerable course. Acceptance of the Macao type situation would involve our giving up control of the police and civil administration and leaving hostages with the Chinese Communists, who could force us to take any action they wished locally contrary to our interests, with no prospect of a termination of this state of affairs. Moreover, it was contrary to our material interests. In making contingency plans for a possible evacuation it was of the greatest importance that nothing of this should become known locally, since the present position rested on maintenance of confidence, and once it were seen that we were making a move to evacuate control of the situation would be rapidly lost. So grave however were the potential risks involved that it was desirable that sone contingency planning against a sudden emergency should be undertaken urgently. For this purpose a small planning tean might be set up under Commonwealth Office chairmanship to include representatives from the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Office, and a representative with recent experience of civil administration in Hong Kong, which might draw on information from the Treasury, Bank of England and Board of Trade as required. The tean should aim to produce its preliminary report as soon as possible and subsequently it could be considered if, subject to consultation with the Governor, a representative should visit Hong Kong and Singapore for further consultations under appropriate cover.
The Working Party
Invited the Commonwealth Office, in consultation with the
Ministry of Defence, Foreign Office and Cabinet Office, to draft a report on the lines indicated in the Chairman's summing up.
Cabinot Office, S.W.1.
18th July 1967
(97793)
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