SECRET
HONG KONG
ANNEX 2 TO OPD(67)67
There is reliable evidence from Hong Kong sources that the Chinese Government's "ultimatum" of 20 August to Her Majesty's Government about action against the local communist press was in part a response to an appeal made to Peking by local communists for a demonstration of greater solidarity. There had earlier been increasing evidence of low communist morale in Hong Kong and indications that the communist leadership considered that they had no hope of obtaining the support of the population as a whole. The ultimatum itself and the attack on the British Mission in Peking will however have boosted morale in local communist organisations and will have encouraged supporting demonstrations on the other side of the frontier. Already there has been increased local communist activity and further border incidents.
2. Before the ultimatum was issued the local communists had resorted to the use of more powerful and sophisticated devices resulting in death and injuries to civilians. There is also evidence, e.g. the murder of an anti-communist radio commentator with a petrol bomb, that a campaign against selected persons is to be expected. The continuation of firm measures by the Hong Kong Government, including action against the communist press, makes it likely that violence will increase rather than diminish. Three Chinese communist sympathisers, connected with the publishing and printing of the independently owned newspaper the "Afternoon News", were each sentenced on 28 August to three years imprisonment and a court order was made for the suppression of the newspapers for six months. One locally engaged employee of the New China News Agency, an official Chinese Government organisation, and another communist journalist are serving two-year sentences of imprisonment and proceedings have been instituted against five other reporters, one of whom is a member of the New China News Agency.
3. In addition to repercussions in Hong Kong, the firm measures taken by the Hong Kong Government, particularly against the pro-communist press, may result in still further retaliatory action against the British Mission in Peking and against British subjects in China. The acting Governor has been asked to take this into consideration when deciding on further measures. He has agreed to do so but has pointed out that in the course of necessary action against Chinese demonstrators it may be impossible to avoid the arrest of further communist journalists. One such arrest has already taken place. It would clearly be wrong to modify the policy of firmness in Hong Kong, for this would be the first step towards the abdication of our authority and the creation of a Macao-type situation.
4.
Any attempt to negotiate with the present Chinese leadership over Hong Kong either on the basis of a return to the status quo or on the basis of a British withdrawal from the colony under conditions acceptable to both sides would be out of the question. Any sign that we had such a negotiation in mind would be interpreted by the Chinese as
/weakness
1
SECRET