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the welfare of our diplomatic staff than with that of other British subjects who enjoy no diplomatic immunities, of doubtful worth though these may be in China at present.
(iii) The uncertain political future of China
We cannot tell how the Chinese revolution is going to develop. It may be that, whether under Mao Tse-tung or those who purport to speak for him, or under some other fanatic and xenophobic leadership, the present phase of violent hostility towards foreigners will continue or even intensify. If that happens there is no hope of any useful and effective diplomatic contact with China for the fore- seeable future, and the presence of a mission in Peking will be a waste of money and a hostage to fortune. But opposition to the present regime is increasing all over the country. This opposition, as far as we know, is still based on factional, personal and local rather than on national interests, and it appears to lack cohesion or firm ideological motivation. It may lead to a fragmentation of the country into regional areas, virtually autonomous, under local leaders or warlords as in the 1920's. This would not necessarily be an entirely welcome development from our point of view, for our ability to exploit it would depend on the nature of the regime or . faction which held the two areas of China of prime concern to us the national capital in Peking and Kwangtung province, contiguous with Hong Kong. If the factions which held these areas were Maoist, or otherwise hostile to foreign interests, we would be no better off than we are now. But we should not overlook the possibility that one or other of these factions, or both, may tend towards "revisionism" and peaceful coexistence. Here again it would not be of great practical help to us in the day-to-day problems of Hong Kong if the faction that held Peking were more friendly towards us but that which held Kwangtung, with which in practice we would have to deal on Hong Kong affairs, remained hostile. Never- theless, a more tractable regime in either Peking or Kwangtung might offer us openings for exercising some diplomatic leverage, whether in relations specifically to Hong Kong or more generally.
So far we have discussed the possibility that either Mao's regime may be followed by one equally xenophobic and exercising greater nation-wide control than Mao's does at present, or that China may break up into virtually autonomous regions; and we have concluded that the first of these possibilities would offer us little or no opening for diplomacy and that the second, while less gloomy, would also be a very dicey proposition from our point of view. But there is a third possibility. There are good grounds for believing that the violent phase of the Chinese revolution may have reached its climax and may from now on blow itself out. This could be either a slow or a sudden process. If it is slow there is little a diplomatic mission in Peking can do but to watch and report. But if the process is swift dramatic changes can take place in China which, in the context of Hong Kong, we may want to exploit without delay. This would require the presence in Peking of a fully operative diplomatic mission.
(iv) Hong Kong.
Hong Kong is our main residual problem with China. Between now and 1997 when the lease on the "New Territories" expires we shall want to seek a peaceful settlement with China to incorporate Hong Kong into the Chinese political community with proper safeguards both for our interests and
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