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IMMEDIATE HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
Telno. 397'
TU SECRET
30 March 1968
412A
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Addressed to F.0. telegram No. 397 of 30 March Repeated for information to:
Peking.
(4)eking telegram No. 242:
Sino-British Relations.
I agree that in the face of this continued Chinese official insis- tence for a 'reply' to their communications on Sino-British relations, it would be hard to justify remaining silent. The idea of an oral - (repeat oral) statement in Peking, couched in relatively formal terms has to my mind a good deal to commend it.
2. There is admittedly a risk that wires will get crossed if a state- ment of this sort is made in Peking while the conversations here, re- ported in my telegram No. 387, continue. I do not think that it can necessarily be assumed that the Chinese are deliberately trying to initiate concurrent 'exchanges on two levels'. Given current confusion in China, it may well be that the channel which has opened here leads back to a rather different group of people than those who are responsible for taking the initiative in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, we hardly have enough information at present to do more than speculate on the possi- bilities. But my general feeling is that we need to be rather more cautious and less forthcoming in what we say through the official channel than in our exchanges through the channel which may lead directly back to Chou en Lai.
3. It seems to me, then, that the wording of our "reply" to M.F.A. should be as short as possible and in as general terms as are consistent with dealing with the specific points raised by the Vice Minister on 8 March. I believe that we should be careful not to drag in any issues (e.g. 'freedom of travel' between Hong Kong and China) which the Chinese have not raised themselves; and that we should not, in order to appear con- ciliatory, make statements (e.g. to the effect that Hong Kong is the of Sino-British relations') that could later be used against us by the Chinese. It seems essential to bear in mind the fact that we have no guarantee of getting any concession whatever from the Chinese side as a result of making this statement; and therefore to avoid gratuitously throw- ing away any of the cards we hold in our hands.
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4. In short, I think that the statement must eschew any open-ended commitment, e.g. of our 'wish in principle' to meet the views of the Chinese Government about Hong Kong; or 'to discuss at any time' such points about Hong Kong as the Chinese Government may put forward. It must be borne in mind that if the interests of Hong Kong only are considered the advantages of such 'discussion or negotiation' are at present pretty small. Nor is it true, at any rate in relations to Hong Kong, that 'there is no problem existing between the two sides which cannot be solved by goodwill etc. There are in fact a number of problems here e.g. in particular those relating to Communist education which will be very diffi. cult indeed to solve as long as the Chinese are bound by the doctrines of
/the cultural
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