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both the N.C.N.A. correspondente.
This would however have
bcen a gambler's throw. If it had not worked we should have
put ourselves in a most awkward and indefensible position.
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In any case we lost our best chance of bringing the Governor
to accept this course when we agreed to let him play the hand
his way.
As things now stand the unilateral release of both
Hsueh and Lo may still in theory be the best way to proceed;
but there is no chance whatsoever of the Governor agreeing to
this.'
Moreover the
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5
It would remain a gambler's throw.
future utility of the Chinese contact is now also thrown into
the balance. As the Governor has pointed out the contact is
idiosyncratic but he is certainly useful. His reports in the
past have generally been reliable. While not of paramount
importance, it is certainly to be borne in mind that if we now
discredit the contact by flagrantly ignoring the advice he has
conveyed from Peking he will decline to act for us in future.
10. We had earlier envisaged that, if we had no satisfactory
results through the covert channel, we could make a follow-up
approach through our Mission in Peking, if this seemed desirable.
The Governor would certainly argue against such an approach as
flying in the face of the contact's advice. Perhaps a more
important objection is that it is all too likely that such an
approach would merely encourage the Chinese to name an
unacceptable price. Accordingly. I am against it.
11.
}
I think we have, reluctantly, to agree with the Governor
that in the situation with which we are now confronted it is
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/ best to