SEORET
· 3-
The contact undertook however to write to Peking and enquire
about the possibility of releasing Mr. Grey. This was
agreed (Hong Kong telegrams Nos. 2000 and 2001). Matters
did not end there. At the subsequent meetings held at the
request of the contact on 21, 24 and 25 September (Hong Kong
telegrams Nos. 2007, 2008, 2030 and 2031), it became clear
that he had discussed the matter in depth with a prominent
mainland representative in the Colony (Li Cho-chih of the
Bank of China) and had also written to Peking about Mr. Grey
but in the most general terms. This meant that our original
intention of making a firm offer for the release of Mr. Grey,
but in strictly defined terms, had not been achieved. On the
one hand we were not forcing the Chinese hand; on the other
we were offering then the chance of forcing up the price for
the release of Mr. Grey.
5. At the meeting on 25 September the contact delivered a
return message in the following terms:-
(a) Chou En-lai was concerned about Mr. Grey and would act
"when the opportunity occurred".
He had asked the
contact to send an assessment of the situation regarding
Mr. Grey.
In any
(b) The mainland representative, Li Cho-chih, had received
instructions that the contact should not press ahead
with discussions about an exchange for Mr. Grey.
negotiation of this kind Peking felt they would be bound
to ask for more than the release of Hsueh probably at
least all the fiften news workers imprisoned in Hong Kong
in whom they are known to have an interest.
SECRET
1,(0) Li had