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4.
Jay then went on to discuss the possible time factor in Grey's release. He personally thought it would be in the "fairly near future", but suggested that it was unlikely to be later than early 1969: he explained the later date by saying that a new target of l1st January had been set for complete de-escalation: he then added: "indeed it could well be when the Governor returns from leave in mid-December".
5.
Jay said that he would like to send his assessment of the situation to CHOU En Lai within the next day or two. The line he was thinking of taking was to say fairly briefly that this was the one important item which is outstanding from last year's difficulties, that the eyes of the Western world and particularly of the press had been focussed on this question of Grey, and undoubtedly their interest could again be easily stirred up:
that from conversations with influential friends in Hong Kong (Jay again emphasised that his mission in Hong Kong was to contact Europeans and "senior people") there was a strong feeling that the Chinese action in detaining Grey was barbaric. He asked for advice as to whether anything else might be said on the subject and I took the opportunity of saying that I should like to think the matter over and contact him in the next day or two.
6.
were:-
Other points allegedly made by LI in the discussion
(1) City District Officers System. LI said that local communists were most suspicious of the Government's action in introducing the C.D.0. scheme. They were convinced that it was the first step in the introduction of local elections leading to internal self-government. LI said that if this were in fact the Hong Kong Government's intention, then it could not possibly be tolerated by the Chinese Government. Jay claims that he hotly refuted the idea that the introduction of the C.D.O. scheme was a forerunner of internal self-government in Hong Kong. He said to LI that the British would not be so stupid as to run such a risk, that they were very well aware of the situation and needed no guidance how to handle this sort of situation. In spite of this, LI apparently still held some doubts about the Government's intentions and thought that if he were right in his suspicions, one of the first moves of the C.D.0's. would be to have elections to local committees.
(ii)
Alleged S.B. Surveillance of Jay. Jay said that LI had again expressed concern about this: he had been thinking the matter over since his previous discussion with Jay and felt that in spite of the assurances Jay had received there was still something in the Peking warning. Apparently he explained himself by saying that it was not necessarily the case that Cater or the Governor, or even the Director Special Branch would know what was happening: it was possible, for example, that the surveillance was being carried out by the Americans or by the Nationalists. Jay rejected the idea of the Americans being responsible - "they are so clumsy in these affairs' but thought it possible, even probable, that the Nationalists were behind the whole thing. He said that the Nationalist agents and the communist agents within Special Branch clearly knew each other although they would pretend not: he thought it highly likely that the Nationalists may from
/contd...
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