Our views on problems of publicity and detainees
are set out in other telegrams. As regards
Hsueh, there seems to be a measure of agreement
that there is little to be achieved by his
premature release on its own. As observed in
Peking tel. No. 906, his value as a potential
concession has decreased with time and must now be
slight. To go outside the normal processes of
law with only a negligible chance of its paying
dividends seems pointless.
3. It is still our view that ideally the move
most likely to prompt the early release of Grey
is the premature release of both Hsueh and Lo.
But we realise fully the difficulties of justifying
such a move in Hong Kong, particularly in the
absence of any assurance or even hint regarding
the release of Grey; and indeed in face of the
advice received from contact that there is
"no price". If it failed we should be in the
embarrassing position anticipated in para. 2
of tel. No. 1414 of 30 August.
4. In this difficult situation, we accept that the
least unsatisfactory course of action is to
proceed as you propose, i.e. await the release
of Hsueh, with remission, on 17 November and
see what then happens.
032717 E.W.& S., Ltd. 164m 3/67.
15.
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