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b)
.)
12
The covert channel has until now proved slow and we have
not been able to julge its effectiveness. Its use for this
particular purpose might result in unacceptable delay.
In addition I think that we should offer Hsueh and Lo from
the outset since to offer first the one and, if this is not
enough, the other will not merely add to the delays (sinoe
neither in secret nor in formal discussion will our
interlocutor have authority to clinch a deal immediately)
but will also, as Mr. Cradock argues, encourage the Chinese
to ask for more.
As Mr. Cradock very rightly says, the main risk of any
preliminary discussion with the Chinese about Mr. Grey is that
it will encourage them to push up their price. For that reason
I see advantage in initiating discussions through the covert
channel rather than through the Mission. If the Chinese
initial asking price is unacceptably high, it should be easier
to get them to lower it if it has only been put to us informally
than it would be if it had been put to us through the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and thus possibly have become an issue of
face. I think that this advantage outweighs the disadvantages
of the admitted cumbersomeness and slowness of the covert
channel. We should however try to ensure that our emissary
impresses on his contact the desirability of speed; and in
the final instance if after, say, a month, we have had no
satisfactory results through the covert channel, we can always
make a follow-up approach through the Mission if this seems
/desirable.
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